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This thesis is a study of various techniques which provide
incentives for contractors for work under a Master Ship Repair
(MSR) contract. These techniques are used to motivate the con-
tractor to adhere to the original schedule without degradation- of
quality control when growth work or change orders entitle the
contractor to an increase in price, changes in schedule, or both.
The methodology used to investigate these techniques was
primarily personal interviews with Government and contractor per-
sonnel involved in the ship repair/overhaul industry and liter-
ature research.
The results of this study indicate contractors are incenti-
vized to reduce schedule slippages by a process of: stabilizing
regional workloads, supplementing training, coordinating confer-
ences, increasing manning levels, and by changing certain milestone
dates and work procedures. This thesis also proposes an award
fee contract type which incorporates the above as an alternative
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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's world where management, both in the public and
private sectors, is continually trying to optimize each dollar
spent by maximizing the output from these expenditures, there
comes a point where spending fewer dollars will not result in the
most effective output, especially in the long run. This is par-
ticularly true when it comes to national defense. In the light
of the problems with the shipbuilding industry with regard to
claims and cost overruns, the United States Navy is required to
maximize the effectiveness of the dollars it spends for repair
(maintenance) of its vessels in overhaul because of increased
scrutiny by Congress and the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) . The Navy's maintenance programs provide for ships to be
overhauled at regularly scheduled intervals for the purpose of
keeping its fleet in a sound operating condition. The Master
Ship Repair Contract (MSR) is an agreement between the Govern-
ment and a contractor which states the terms and conditions in
effect should the contractor be awarded a j ob order for repair
work at a later date. The job order issued unaer the MSR is the
instrument with which the Navy contracts with industry for over-
haul and repair work. Job orders are awarded under the MSR by
means of formal advertising or negotiation and are generally of a
firm fixed price type. The method of contracting depends on the
conditions surrounding each case. Once a schedule is established
and the contract is awarded to a repair facility, the contractor
has no impetus (incentive) to meet specific dates, such as Light

Off Examinations (LOE's) and delivery dates, should unforeseen
requirements arise which may cause delays during the overhaul.
The contractor is sincere when responding to the solicitation for
repair v/ork, but should "growth work" (new unforeseen work often
found when equipment is opened, inspected and tested, or when new
requirements are discovered) emerge, or if the Navy causes delays,
the contractor has no incentive to meet the original or possibly
even the revised scheduled delivery date. This is because the
contractor knows the delays are not caused by his own actions and
the contract will not be terminated. The contractor also realizes
that if there is a slack work period following the instant con-
tract, it is an advantage to prolong his effort. Therefore the
longer this expertise is available, the more stable the v/ork force
will be; thus resulting in a better utilization of personnel.
It is important that U.S. Naval vessels adhere to repair
schedules in order to meet future commitments. Also, it becomes
of the utmost concern that contractors meet the original schedule
and not sacrifice quality in this quest. Thus the purpose of
this paper is to determine if Master Ship Repair contracts can be
effectively incentivized so the contractor will meet the original
scheduled dates and not forfeit quality work, when growth work or
changes entitle the contractor to an increase in price or schedule
or both.
It should also be pointed out, this paper develops a model to
get the ship out of the shipyard on schedule despite the many




The methodology used to develop the model which focuses on
incentivization of a MSR, was primarily personal interviews and
literature research. The interviews were conducted with Govern-
ment personnel involved with procurement, especially those having
experience in ship repair/overhaul. Ship repair/ overhaul con-
tractors were also interviewed in order to provide insight into
both sides of the repair problem. Additional research information
was secured from journal and magazine articles, Government train-
ing manuals, instructions, circulars and periodicals, and Govern-
ment memoranda and correspondence.
The approach used in this paper is to first provide a general
background on the ship repair problem., followed by the objectives
of this study and methodology used to develop an incentive model
for ship repair (Chapter 1) . Next (Chapter 2) , the MSR contract
concept will be explained as to its definition, purpose and gen-
eral use. Chapter 3 provides information concerning the respon-
sibilities and missions of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN
(SUPSHIPs) and the repair organization in general. Chapter 4
describes the purpose, measurement, and justification for con-
tractual incentives in general concerns. Chapter 5 will present
a preliminary hypothesis, research data, and an interpretation of
the methods of analysis used in this study.
Finally, Chapter 6 will provide the conclusions reached by
this analysis as well as tender recommendations.
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II. MASTER SHIP REPAIR CONTRACTS
A. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE
The Master Contract for Repair and Alteration of Vessels is
normally referred to as the Master Ship Repair (MSR) Contract.
The purpose of this particular type of contract is to establish
in advance the terms under which a contractor will effect repairs,
completions, alterations (commonly referred to as repair work)
and additions to vessels and repair parts needed to complete such
work under the provisions of job orders issued by various activ-
ities (usually by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair, USN (SUPSHIP)). Through the use of the MSR, administra-
tive costs and efforts are reduced, the awards for repair work
are expedited and contractors have an opportunity to bid on and
perform repair work under common terms and conditions which are
consistent and uniform.
In practice, the MSR is essentially an agreement between a
contractor and a repairing activity which describes in advance
the details and conditions that will be in effect, should the
contractor be awarded a job order to accomplish a specific task.
A unique facet of this contract is that a contractor which is
awarded a MSR (DD Form 731) is not guaranteed work, nor is he
qualified to perform every possible job order that will arise
aboard a vessel, because repair work varies considerably in
scope and in difficulty of performance.
It should be noted that a j ob order under the MSR cannot be
used to purchase material or work which is not a part of the
11

vessel repair or overhaul package. This also pertains to:
"... alteration jobs requiring performance by
MSR contractors which must have control of
berthing facilities. Design, pre-fab work
and material procurements are examples. The
reason why the MSR contracts are not to be
used are (i) that competition would be limited
to only MSR contract holders who have control of
berthing facilities, and (ii) the MSR contract-,
terms are not designed for such procurements."
Other areas where MSR's cannot be used are:
1) Personal services
.
2) Repairs to material in storage (spares)
.
3) Manufacturing when not part of a ship work job order.
4) Design work when not part of a ship work job order.
5) Towing or stevedoring when not included in the job
order for repair of the vessel.
6) Procurement of material and cost of packing, crat-
ing or shipping material when not included in the job order for
repair of the vessel.
7) Utility services when not incidental to the repair
of the vessel.
Lastly, Master Contracts are entered into with contractors
located within the United States. When dealing with repair in
foreign countries, the MSR is used merely as a guide.
B. BIDS AND QUOTATIONS FOR JOB ORDERS
Whenever a specific work requirement arises which is covered
by a Master Contract, bids or quotations on this effort will be
requested from prospective contractors who have previously ex-
ecuted a Master Contract and also from contractors who possess
the necessary prerequisites and consent to executing a Master
12

Contract before the issuance of a job order. The Navy relies on
formal advertising of contracts to assure that the price for the
repair and overhaul of its ships are fair and reasonable. This
procedure is outlined in the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
as well as in Chapter 7 of the Ship Repair Contracting Manual
(Repair Manual) . Chapter 7 of the Repair Manual also discusses
when negotiation techniques will be the basis for the award of
the job order. In the instance where a contractor is invited to
bid, the contracting officer will provide as much detail as pos-
sible: i.e. , as to the type of work which will have to be per-
formed; the date the vessel will be available and the required
date of xvork completion. Interested contractors will be allowed
to inspect the work to be accomplished before they "submit a bid
. . . for the performance of the work in accordance with the in-
2
vitation for bids ..."
After the bids or quotations are received and evaluated, and
a contractor is selected, all pertinent data (including the price
for the work) are set forth in a job order (DD Form 731-1).
This job order is subject to the provisions of the Master
Contract
.
Some instances where a contracting officer can issue a job
order "without inviting bids or requesting quotations" are in
emergency conditions - 1) when necessary repair work must be
done immediately or the vessel, its cargo, or stores would be
in danger, or, 2) when military obligations require immediate
work to be done aboard a vessel. These changes are known as
unpriced modifications or unpriced job orders. Job order
modifications can be either bilateral or unilateral. Bilateral
13

modifications are those which have the signature of both the
contractor and the Government on the document. DAR calls these
types of modifications "supplemental agreements." This modi-
fication is generally pre-priced (i.e., the price is agreed upon
before the performance of the work) . A unilateral job order
modification is an unpriced modification issued by the ACO or
his designee. Here, the price is agreed upon after the work
commences
.
Oftentimes, accurate descriptions of work are not always
available, therefore, as work progresses, the Navy is often
required through an instrument called a contract modification
to change the contract terms initially agreed upon. In many
cases these modifications make up over half of the total contract
value and are negotiated with the contractor doing the repair on
a sole source basis.
"The Navy, therefore, generally loses any bene-
fits that may have been obtained through the
initial competition and is at a disadvantage
when negotiating prices for modifications.
. . . therefore . . . Private shipyards are not
only familiar with how busy their competitors
are but also generally know the prices at which
they must operate. In short, shipyards -- are
aware of how much competition exists, -- know
that the fixed price of the original contract
is not firm because it will be modified for
substantial work that is unknown at the time
of the award, and -- can anticipate negotiating
many of these modifications with knowledge of
actual^costs which is not made available to the
Navy."
This illustrates the fact that the Navy is decidedly at a




C. MSR CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS
SUPSHIPs, which administers the MSR, has no authority to
modify any clauses of the MSR Contract (See Appendix A for a
list of the clauses) , except at the direction of the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) Deputy Commander for Contracts. This
is to ensure uniform contracts and to keep job orders within the
limits and boundaries of the MSR.
SUPSHIPs does have the opportunity to recommend to NAVSEA
any changes or modifications which will help the administration of
job orders. This type of recommendation is encouraged by NAVSEA
to keep contracts current. Because of changes in statutes, exec-
utive orders and procurement regulations, the MSR will be revised
periodically (but not more than annually) to incorporate any
changes. Once the changes are made, all outstanding Master Con-
tracts will be replaced by the amended version. This is done
simply by issuing the revised edition of the MSR simultaneously
with the cancellation of all existing MSR's.
D. CANCELLATION
If a repair facility is sold or undergoes a transfer of title,
the MSR is not transferred, but is cancelled. Should the new
owners desire a Master Contract, they will have to apply in ac-
cordance with current regulations.
A clause in the MSR provides that either party has the right
to cancel the contract. It is NAVSEA' s policy to cancel MSR




2) Change of firm's name, management or owners.
3) Default under a job order.
4) Inclusion of Joint Consolidated List of Debarred,
Ineligible and Suspended Contractors as outlined
in Section 1, Part 6 of [DAR]
.
5) Removal or sale of facilities.
6) Revision of DD [DAR] Form 731.
7) No longer meets standards for award of the
MSR Contract.
"
A prescribed format for cancellation is applicable (Appendix
4-C of the Ship Repair Contracting Manual ) and must be followed
by both parties.
E . SUMMARY
"At the present time, the SUPSHIPS award con-
tracts for ship repair and overhaul to the
private shipyards ... using formal advertising
procedures. However, the SUPSHIPs frequently
find it necessary to negotiate change orders
or modifications to the formally advertised con-
tracts because all of the required repairs can-
not be identified until the ship is "opened
and inspected" to determine its internal con-
dition. A ship's internal condition can vary
for many reasons, including the length of ser-
vice between maintenance intervals and the
i care exercised by the ships crew. The oper-
and inspection procedures do not occur until
after award of the formally advertised con-
tracts . " 6
Overall, through the use of the MSR Contract, contractors
have an opportunity to bid on vessel repair work, awards for the
repair work are made more quickly, and administrative costs are
significantly decreased. It is noted, the MSR is the system
the Navy presently uses, but changes can be added to improve
it. NAVSEA and SUPSHIPs are continually trying to promote an
improved scheme. Hopefully, changes proposed by this thesis





Before explaining the intricacies of contract incentives,
it becomes important to briefly describe the repair organization.
The ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
U.S. Naval Vessels belongs to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO)
.
"He formulates detailed strategic plans to carry out
7the missions assigned to the Navy by the Secretary of Defense."
These plans include broad logistics requirements which are given
to the several Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) for further procurement
action via the Chief of Naval Material
"He [CNO] approves the annual overhaul sched-
ules for all fleet ships as recommended by
NAVSEA and the Commanders of the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets. He also approves all overhaul
schedules established by the District Command-
ants and by the Off icers - in-Charge of Naval
Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities (INACT-
SHIPFACs) for ships under their cognizance ...
[The] CNO is the ultimate approval auth-
ority for alterations which affect the mili-
tary characteristics of ships. The SUPSHIP
should request authority for alterations from
the cognizant SYSCOM." 8
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the SYSCOM from
which SUPSHIPs receives its authority. NAVSEA' s mission is to
provide material support for Navy and Marine Corps ships and
crafts, the shipboard weapon systems and components plus the
missiles, ammunition, mines, torpedoes, and all other surface
and underwater expendable ordnance.
"NAVSEASYSCOM is responsible for the research
design, development, logistics planning, test,
technical evaluation, acquisition, procurement,
contracting, production, construction, manufac-
ture, inspection, fitting out, supply, mainten-
ance, alteration, conversion, repair, overhaul,
17

modification, inventory management, and ad-
q
vance base outfitting of naval material ..."
NAVSEA acts as the Coordinator for Shipbuilding, Conversion,
and Repair for the Department of Defense (DOD) . SUPSHIPs, the
contract administration component of NAVSEA then administers:
"... Navy Department and other Department
of Defense shipbuilding, design, conversion
and facility contracts at assigned private
shipyards; procure [s] and administer [s
]
overhauls, repairs, alterations, activations
performed on naval ships at private yards
under Master Contract, for ReDair and Altera-
tion of Vessels; . . ." iU
Thus, SUPSHIP's contracting officers are authorized to use
the MSR Contracts (which NAVSEA has awarded) via job orders, on
behalf of the Government. SUPSHIPs also administers these con-
tracts and job orders. Of course, SUPSHIP's authority is limited
by DAR, Naval Procurement Directives (NPD) , the Ship Repair Con -
tracting Manual (Repair Manual ) , and the requirements and limita-
tions imposed by the appointing authority. SUPSHIPs acts as a
"procuring contracting office for purposes of placement of the
MSR contract, and award of job orders thereunder by formal ad-
vertising or by negotiation." SUPSHIP is a member of the
Contract Administration Services (CAS) and carries out the con-
tract administration functions listed in DAR 1-406 and 20-704 to:
"... the extent applicable to the MSR Contract
and job orders and to other contracts assigned
at commercial shipyards under his cognizance,
as listed in the DOD Directory of Contract -,
2
Administration Services Component (DOD 4105. 59H)."
A. REPAIR PLANNING
Having established that SUPSHIP is a major component of the
repair organization, it is now important to describe how an
18

overhaul is planned. OPNAVINST 4700. 7E is the basis upon which
NAVSEA proposes overhaul schedules. NAVSEA forwards these sched-
ules to Fleet Commanders (FLTCOMs) and Type Commanders (TYCOMs)
for review. The FLTCOMs return the schedules, with comments,
and a mutual agreement is then reached regarding the proposed
schedule. This revised schedule is then sent to the CNO for
final review and for publication. 540 days prior to the over-
haul, NAVSEA sends an advance planning letter and the TYCOM
sends an authorization letter to SUPSHIPs which describes what
work is to be done onboard the vessel during overhaul. This
work is described in terms of NAVSEA Title K SHIPALTS (Ship
Alteration under the cognizance of NAVSEA) and TYCOM Title D
SHIPALTS (alterations equivalent to a repair which are funded
by the TYCOM)
.
During time A- 510 (510 days before the commencement of the
repair overhaul) , NAVSEA and the TYCOM fund the industrial ac-
tivity (SUPSHIP) to perform the overhaul work designated in the
planning and authorization letters.
At A-405, long lead time items are ordered. This would
concern material or design items which require six months or
greater to acquire.
After some pre-overhaul tests and inspections, a ship altera-
tion and repair package (SARP) is prepared (approximately 270
days before overhaul commencement) . The SARP will be the basic
screening action which will denote who will accomplish the work
(whether the ship's force, the intermediate maintenance activity




NAVSEA forwards SUPSHIPs a letter that describes exactly which
K SHIPALTS will be accomplished. A work definition conference
(WDC) is held (6 months prior to overhaul commencement) with
members of the ship, SUPSHIPS, and the TYCOM which finalizes
the work package that will be bid upon.
An invitation for bid (IFB) is next sent out to the repair
activities which have the capability to perform the required
work. Often these work packages are split between contractors.
The reason for this is that in many cases repairs to a vessel
must be performed which will require drydock facilities. In
such cases, adequate competition may often be difficult to achieve,
since relatively few ship repair firms possess such facilities.
By splitting the work package (split bidding) maximum competition
may be obtained. Under split bidding procedures, drydock and
topside work are separated and established as individual lots.
While competition for the drydock portion may be limited, com-
petition for topside work will be opened to many additional firms;
as a result, lower prices may often be obtained for this portion
of the work. By splitting the work package, the Contracting Of-
ficer ensures increased competition in a situation where it
would otherwise be impossible. After a bidders conference and a
bid opening, an axvard is made and the ship is ready to be over-
hauled.
The award is made on a firm fixed-price basis. Even though
the SUPSHIP Contracting Officers must not get "involved" with a
MSR contract with respect to the contractor's costs to the ex-
tent required by a cost type of contract, they still must get
intimately involved with respect to the job order's specified
20

completion date. To comply with this, the contracting officer
and his delegates must have an intimate knowledge of the contrac-
tor's actions and operations. This knowledge can be more easily
secured if the following actions are accomplished:
1) Become knowledgeable about the contractor's Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS) which covers costs and schedule.
2) Use Gant, PERT or CPM charts to plot the progres
of the work and to see where possible "backlogs" to the system
will occur.
3) Maintain records of job order performance so that
deficiencies will continually be folloitfed-up and feedback pro-
vided to the system.
Through this strategy, SUPSHIPs can monitor a contractor's
performance. By advising the contractor of deficiencies in
writing, the contracting officer is stating that adequate qual-
ity standards are not being followed.
Schedule delays sometime ensue because the contractor does
not always feel compelled to speed up the operation to make up
for lost time for delays generated by the Government. It is
true that the contractor will try to meet the original schedule,
but what penalty does the contractor suffer if he does not meet
the original schedule? If there was a large amount *of growth
work, none, except for a loss of pride. The contractor can at-
tribute the delay to growth work or disruptions caused by the
growth work. The strategy must be to motivate and inspire the
contractor to perform quickly and correctly and ensure quality.
To accomplish the above is the primary reason for incentivizing
21

a contract. Chapter 4 will explain how incentives are designed
to function and how the MSR can be changed to assist the Govern-
ment in achieving its goals.
B. SUMMARY
As was pointed out, the repair of a vessel is not an over-
night undertaking. Much time, money and effort is continually
being input into this process. Despite the careful planning
which starts years before the overhaul, major difficulties are
encountered in meeting scheduled milestones. With the detailed
planning schedule as described, the problem concerning schedule
slippages is centered about the work generated during the over-
haul, and not the work cited previous to its commencement.






Incentive contracting is not new to Government procurement.
As far back as 1S61 incentive provisions were used when the
Norfolk Naval Yard built the Monitor . Payment was to be made
only if the Monitor floated, attained a minimum speed, and won
its first battle. Even though the battle between the Monitor
and the Merrimac ended in a draw, the contractor received full
payment. Approximately sixty years later, the first military
airplane was procured from the Wright Brothers under an incen-
tive plan. This contract contained incentives based on the
performance criteria of air speed. The Wright Brothers exceeded
the target speed of forty miles per hour and received a bonus
of six thousand two hundred and fifty dollars. This technique
was the beginning of using a stimulus of additional money to
get a desired action.
In the early 1960 's the Department of Defense (DOD) ini-
tiated several cost reduction programs. The increased use of
incentive contracts (which was supposed to increase contractor
efficiency) was a vital part of this effort and was stressed by
then Secretary of Defense McNamara. The use of incentive con-
tracts is considered by many government officials to be the most
effective component of the cost reduction program.
The Department of Defense has again increased their em-
phasis of using contractual incentives to increase the effic-
iency of contractors. This is especially true when relating the
23

contractor's profit or fee to his success in meeting sched-
ules and satisfying performance requirements. The word "incen-
tive" will be used exclusively in this paper to refer to contrac
tual provisions which relate contractor profit or fee to actual
contract cost, time of completion, or level of performance
achieved. "Performance" will refer to the quality and capabil-
ity of the product designed, developed or delivered rather than
to the ability of the contractor as a manager. Finally, "pro-
duct" will be defined as the completed hardware (whether re-
paired or created) which resulted from the contract.
B. PURPOSE OF INCENTIVES
Originally incentives were used by DOD as a means of reduc-
ing system acquisition costs. Eventually, however, other bene-
fits could be recognized. The DOD Incentive Contracting Guide
states: "Incentive contracting is used to increase technol-
13
ogical progress and produce cost savings." By this is meant
that a contractor is more likely to maintain or increase the
state of the art of an engineering or production capability if
contractual incentives are provided which improve the contrac-
tor's prestige and the nation's technological base. As was
pointed out in the study "An Examination of the Foundations
of Incentive Contracting" (which was sponsored by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics), the follow-




"... (1) incentives motivate efficient con-
tract management and achievement of a high
performance product.
(2) Incentives enable the Government to
reward contractors on the basis of demon-
strated management ability and product
performance
.
(3) Incentives assign to the contractor a
larger portion of contract risk than he
would bear with a CPFF [Cost Plus Fixed
Fee] contract.
(4) Incentives provide explicit communica-
tion of the Government's contracting
obj ectives . "14
This study stated that incentives are just not a means of
monetarily rewarding a good contractor and penalizing an inferior
one, but also a means of effective communication. "Penalties
are of minor consequence unless they stimulate improvement or
discourage a company from seeking DOD business for which its
competence is questionable." Therefore, incentives (whether
positive by providing rewards or negative, by punishment) must be
regarded as mediums to motivate or catalysts for the procurement
system. In a simpler format, the purpose of contract incentives
is to motivate the contractor to produce a system that will meet
or surpass performance goals. The profit motive is the essence
of incentive contracting. For the reasons cited in preceding
paragraphs, incentive contracts must be structured to reflect
profit incentives in such a way that when the contractors maxi-
mize profit it is in the best interest of the Government in that
the planned objectives of the Government are achieved. Mr.
Leonard M. Freeman of the Marshall Space Flight Center described
it perfectly when he said:
25

'The correct definition of incentives is 'that
which incites or tends to incite, to deter-
mination or action'. The proposition of incit-
ing to action is basic; a reward, or negatively
stated, a penalty, which anticipates no action
is not an incentive. Rewards and penalties be-
come incentives when they are correlated with
the expectations of organizations and ultimately
individuals with certain definite actions or levels
of action. Incentives for efficient contract per-
formance exist when contractors expect that ef-
ficient performance will be rewarded more than
lackluster performance, and conversely, that
inefficient performance will be penalized. "16
C. MEASURING INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS
To measure the effectiveness of an incentive, the result of
the contract cannot just be assessed. The key point to remem-
ber is to determine what would have been the results if the in-
centive was not used. The contractor will try to maximize his
profit or fee and be more cost-conscious if more of his own
money is at stake. "It is equally important to acknowledge,
however, the extent to which other objectives of the contractor
may conflict with and perhaps take precedence over his emphasis
on low cost." Much study has been done concerning this very
subject. There is practically a concensus among analysts and
managers that:
"... in the short run, contractor management
does sacrifice short-run profit on defense
business in favor of achieving
(1) company growth
(2) increased share of the industry
market
(3) better public image
(4) organizational prestige
(5) carry-over benefits to commercial
business (commercial spinoffs)
(6) greater opportunity for follow on
bus iness
(7) greater shareholder expectations
for future growth and profit." 18
26

As is evident from the preceding list, contractor management
relates each contract to overall business objectives. To the ex
tent that incentives promote the Government's interests, then
incentives are useful. It must be kept in mind, though, that
other contractor objectives may conflict with and take prec-
edence over various incentives available to him. Before in-
centives are negotiated, it would be advisable to confirm that
"motivational forces" already exist in the contractor's behavior
before an incentive-type of contract is offered. More plainly
spoken is whether the contractor will respond to added profit
or fees. If it appears that incentives will not motivate the
contractor, why get involved with the added monitoring caused
by incentive contracting? In that instance, use a firm fixed-
price contract.
D. INCENTIVE JUSTIFICATION
In 1967, a study was conducted strictly with procurement
(contracting) personnel to see what they felt were the primary
reasons why incentives were used in contracting. The following
bases were given:
"(1) to encourage cost control
(2) to encourage control of schedules
(3) to encourage improvement in product
performance
(4) to promote more efficient allocation
of resources
(5) to provide contractor management with
tools to motivate workers
(6) to obtain optimum trade-offs among
cost, schedule, and performance
(7) to obtain optimum trade-offs among
performance goals




(9) to avoid CPFF contracts when FFP
agreements are not feasible but the
contractor will accept some respon-
sibility for cost overruns.
(10) to achieve contractor assumption of
a large share of the risk associated
with undertakings.
(11) to force government personnel to state
contract objectives more explicitly
(12) to assure clear communication of govern-
ment objectives
(13) to attract contractor management atten-
tion to key objectives
(14) to avoid stating firm requirements when
there is insufficient knowledge for such
statement
(15) to prevent "frozen" design
(16) to assure that acceptance tests will be
included in contracts and subsequently
will not be waived
(17) to assure attainment of minimum
specifications
(18) to discourage "buy-in"
(19) to serve as a compromise with contractors
who demand escalation clauses
(20) to justify higher profits or fees
(21) to obtain desired pricing data
(22) to give contractors protection against
the Renegotiation Board
(23) to conform to DOD policy"! 9
After examining the preceding factors, it becomes readily ap-
parent that the people who award contracts, feel that incentives
do help the Government save money, improve contractor efficiency,
and produce a higher quality product. Items number 16, 17, 19,
20, 21, and 22 in this writer's opinion are weak supports for
the use of incentives. However, this information was taken from
a survey which enumerated all ideas given by the sample popula-
tion and did not make value judgements and eliminate ideas the




The author feels the following:
"From their inception to the final published ASPR
[DAR] , the incentive contract was developed
and structured with specific goals in mind.
Among these goals were efforts to produce cost
consciousness in defense contractors in the
performance of government business.
"™
The required result is a motivated industry which exhibits






As mentioned in previous chapters, the MSR uses firm fixed-
price (FFP) job orders. This type of contract is characterized
by requirements for the contractor to meet minimum standards of
performance, a price which represents full payment for the work,
and a delivery date at a specified time. The FFP places the
greatest amount of risk in the hands of the contractor and is
the easiest contract for the Government to administer since
contract costs are not monitored.
But if the object is to motivate the contractor to meet
initial delivery schedules through the use of an incentive con-
tract, then it is most important to first ascertain which type
of incentive contract is most suited for, and useful with, the
overhaul procedure. The incentive contracts which are currently
in use are
:
1) The cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract.
2) The cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract.
3) The cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract.
4) The fixed-price-incentive (FPI) contract.
The CPFF is appropriate where cost and technical uncertainty
exists and where a level of effort is required. It is not used
when preliminary studies show a high degree of probability that
the system or component can be developed.
Since costs will be reimbursed by the Government, the con-
tractor has less incentive to control the cost of the contract
30

than with other types of contracts. As Belden and Cammack state
in their work Procurement : "There has been a distinct shift
from these instruments [CPFF Contracts] to fixed-price and price
21incentive formulas."
CPFF pricing arrangements provide relatively weak inducements
for contractors to control costs or improve performance; in fact,
CPFF contracts may motivate contractors to increase costs up to
a specified maximum amount beyond which the Government will not
be obligated to reimbruse the contractor. Because an increase
in cost (up to the ceiling) does not reduce the contractor's
fixed fee (although it does reduce profit on sales) , there is
less financial risk to the contractor and "less incentive for
22
cost control than in any other type of contract." This is
particularly true in a situation where a contractor has excess
capacity.
As Mr. Mundhenk addresses in his work, Incentive Contracting
by Money and Methods
,
the CPFF is considered to provide the
contractor only a "minimum incentive for effective management
23
control of cost" and designed chiefly "for use in research
or exploratory development when the level of contractor effort
• a i .-24required is unknown.
Because of the aforementioned limitations, plus the fact
that this type of contract will require more SUPSHIP and Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) personnel, this contract will not
be discussed further.
The CPIF contract is a cost reimbursement type contract
with an incentive formula for establishing final fee.
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"Under this type of contract, the Govern-
ment and the contractor agree, at the
time negotiation of the contract [occurs]
,
upon the target cost of performance. The
target fee is then determined in relation
to the target cost. Also established are
minimum and maximum fees and finally, a fee
adjustment formula. "25
This type of contract is designed primarily for procurement of
development and test requirements, "... where, for example, the
Government has determined that development of a weapon system
is highly probable and feasible ..." 26 This contract is designed
for situations where the risk is unacceptably high for a fixed-
price type of contract, but not high enough to justify a CPFF
contract. CPIF contracts have been used in the procurement of
advanced, engineering, or operational systems development and
first production.
Once again, this type of contract is not conducive to motivat-
ing the contractor in the overhaul scenario.
The last of the cost-type incentive contracts is the CPAF
contract. In terms of risk, this contract falls between a
CPFF and a CPIF contract.
"Its potential lies in procurement for term
level-of -effort contracts, including R § B
programs for which the performance charac-
teristics and requirements are not sufficiently
clear or definite at the start of a project to
use a standard incentive type contract. "2?
Under this type of contract, a contractor is reimbursed for
allowable and allocable costs. The contractor receives a fixed
fee for work performed (generally about three per cent of costs),
and then may earn an additional award fee which is determined
subjectively by Government personnel on the basis of periodic,
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after the fact evaluations of the contractor's performance on
the basis of criteria established in the contract. Typical
major criteria are the performance of operations, technical
management, and utilization of resources. Subfactors within
these criteria often include quality, timeliness, and economy
of performance.
"Originally used for level-of -effort contracts,
this contract type has been expanded to in-
clude nonpersonal and support services in-
cluding the procurement of operation, main- 7Rtenance, logistic, and engineering services.""
This type of contract affords great flexibility in that it pro-
vides for variability of potential fee based on subjective
evaluations of actual performance. In many instances, it is
this fee which furnishes a stronger motivational effect in
comparison to the remaining cost-type contracts.
Specific benefits resulting from the use of CPAF contracts
include better communication between the Government and a con-
tractor, greater latitude for the contractor in control of his
personnel and activities, and "better work statement defini-
29tions."
"The purpose in applying the award fee incentive is to ob-
tain better performance from the contractor than could logically
be expected with other contractual arrangements." This state-
ment made by Major Jerry V. Brown in his work The Award Fee
Incentive: Management Considerations Regarding Its Application
to Research and Development Contracts
,
plus information con-
cerning CPAF contracts provided in previous paragraphs help
support the possibility of using some form of an award fee
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contract (and not necessarily a CPAF contract) to incentivize a
MSR contract. This idea will again be addressed after the dis-
cussion of the FPI contract.
In the FPI contract, a target cost, a target profit, a price
ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor) and a formula for
establishing final profit and price are included. Using the
target cost as a base, target profits are estimated by multiply-
ing the target cost estimate by a specified proportion. Also,
if the actual costs are less (or more) than the estimated cost,
the Government shares in the contractor's "incentive" profits
(or losses). The extent of the sharing is shoi^n in the contract
by a fixed proportion which, when multiplied by the profits or
losses, represents the firm's share; the remaining portion is
the Government's share. Thus, both the Government and the con-
tractor share any differences that occur between actual and
target costs.
"The rationale for this type of contracting
is that the contractor will constructively
attempt to reduce costs, make a better pro-
duct, or expedite production if he can share
in cost savings and realize a profit from
his superior performance . "31
The FPI contract is appropriate when the use of the FFP
contract is inappropriate and the program is of such a nature
that the assumption of a degree of cost responsibility by the
contractor is likely to provide him with a positive profit
incentive for effective cost control and contract performance.
Contract performance requirements must be such that there is
reasonable opportunity for the incentive provisions to have a




Even though a FFP contract can be classified as an "approp-
riate" contract in the ship overhaul industry, it still does not
motivate the contractor to increase his "work pace" to meet
changes in schedule caused by growth work. Here then, the degree
of "appropriateness" comes into play and an FPI contract may
help to "expedite production" if the contractor may share in
the savings and realize a profit.
B. INITIAL HYPOTHESIS
Considering the initial information obtained, it becomes
apparent that an FPI contract or some type of an award fee con-
tract may be a possible solution to the delivery problem. The
FPI and the CPAF contracts can be used with the incentives
linked to the milestones of each overhaul. This will allow the
contract administrators to use the monetary incentives to moti-
vate the contractors to adhere to delivery schedules. Also a
new contract type will be considered, a fixed-price award fee
(FPAF) contract. This hypothesis is proposed under the assump-
tion that the added administrative cost of incentivizing a MSR
contract, although more than the present cost to administer FFP
type contracts, is still less than the cost of:
1) keeping a ship in overhaul longer than necessary,
2) the cost of keeping a ship's crew in the yards when
they would be better utilized performing their functions on
an operating ship, and,
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3) the loss in morale of the ship which has to stay out on
the line at sea because the "relief" ship is extended in the
yards.
Another assumption which is made is that NAVSEA and the TYCOM
would be willing to fund the added costs of incentives for the
reasons cited in the preceding lines.
C. DATA COLLECTION
In order to validate the initial hypothesis, interviews
were conducted with Government personnel involved in the acq-
uisition process to obtain their ideas regarding a possible
solution to the acquisition of the repair effort. The majority
of the interviews were with U.S. Navy personnel involved in the
ship repair industry. Other individuals were interviewed from
another service who had experienced similar "growth work" and
schedule problems when repairing major weapon systems. Ship
repair contractors were also interviewed in order to receive
an appraisal of the present repair system and invited their
opinions about incentivizing the MSR contract. The detailed
results of those inquiries will be discussed later.
The structure of the interviews was to first discuss the
problems associated with the ship repair industry (to build a
scenario) and then pose questions to see their view of the
situation. The answer to the first question will be from all
the people interviewed as summarized below.
It is important to apprise the reader that comments will be
presented by the writer after each response. These comments
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are solely the opinion of the writer and are not intended to
apply to every possible situation.
1 . Incentives
Question. Do you feel that if the present MSR contracts
were incentivized, contractors would be able to deliver ships in
overhaul on schedule (or ahead of schedule) despite the fact
that "growth work" indicates that delivery dates will not be
met?
Of the 25 people interviewed, 5 7% believe that incen-
tives will solve the problem, 22% believe that incentives will
not work, 8% believe incentives are not necessary in the ship
repair industry, and 13% were undecided whether incentives
would be a feasible solution.
A further breakdown of the above question shows: that
among the Navy personnel interviewed, 60% believe in incentives,
27% do not, and 13% are undecided; that among the contractors
interviewed, 33% are for incentives, 17% are against, and 50%
believe incentives are not necessary and the system works well
as presently created.
It is obvious that the Navy personnel involved with
the ship repair industry believe that the contractor must be
motivated to complete his work. The implausible factor regard-
ing the contractor results is that only 33% of the contractors
interviewed were of the opinion that incentives would motivate




a. Personnel of the opinion that the MSR contract can
be incentivized expressed the following views:
(1) Contractors are not always motivated by a FFP
contract. Schedule deadlines and pressure by
the Government are often inadequate to influence
the repair facility to "speed up" its operation,
especially if the delays can be construed as
"Government" caused. The motivation problem is
often compounded by the fact that the firm may
be in a slack work cycle or the contractor re-
fuses to incur the added costs of overtime.
(2) Incentives will give leeway to the contractor
to make trade-off decisions.
(3) A certain percentage increase in profit may
be less costly to the Government than the
present system.
(4) In the absence of a stabilized workload, incen-
tives may be the only means a contractor will
have to be able tc obtain a realistic profit.
(5) Incentive type contracts will eliminate some
of the extreme cases of ruthless bidding by
contractors
.
The arguments in favor of incentives serve that purpose
except for item l.a(5). The writer is of the opinion that
"ruthless" bidding does not occur. The reason for this opinion
is that bid competition is motivated by the individual contrac-
tor's capability and work load, and not by conscientious
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attempts by certain contractors to destroy the market by "ruth-
lessly" bidding and undermining competition.
b. Personnel of the opinion that the MSR contract
cannot be incentivized expressed the following views:
(1) There will be a problem with administering
incentive contracts since the people pres-
ently employed have been using a FFP contract
and must be re-trained to cope with a new con-
tract type.
This item raises a valid point (which was raised in a pre-
vious section of the paper) regarding the added personnel neces-
sary to administer an incentive contract. After discussing
this detail with various people assigned in contract adminis-
tration capacities, it was assured that this problem could be
overcome with a few additional people for the contract review.
(2) Specifications are often poor and inadequate.
The contractor will not be able to respond to
an incentive until the specification packages
are better prepared. The contractors them-
selves voiced this same view.
The above cites inadequate specifications as a reason not to
use an incentive. Specifications should always be submitted
in the best possible format but better results might be achieved
in instances where specifications are lacking, by use of an in-
centive-type contract. The respondent answers provide a reason
for issuing an incentive contract and not a reason used against
this type of contract.
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(3) The large amount of paperwork presently re-
quired by the system will be compounded and
beyond the control of the contractor.
This response does signal an area in which the Government
can assist the contractor; namely, the elimination of paper-
work which is not essential for the supervision of an overhaul.
This point can be used as a basis for another study in the
future
.
(4) The varying amounts of growth work make incen-
tives unrealistic.
The above has a certain amount of truth to it, especially
when considering an overhaul which experiences fifty per cent
or more in growth work. The goal of incentivizing the MSR
with respect to schedule is to motivate the contractor to
finish on schedule, despite the growth work.
(5) Incentives will not work as long as the con-
tractor's hands are tied regarding assigning
schedules
.
Saying incentives hinder adherence to schedules is actually
a weak reason. The purpose of the incentive is to have the con-
tractor meet the assigned schedule or other objective. This
fact was brought up by a contractor simply because it was felt
that contractors are not given enough time to complete the
contract. It is highly unlikely that contractors will contin-
ually become involved with contracts which the contractor feels
cannot be accomplished in the time provided. This may occur
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occasionally, but not all the time. It is assumed that Gov-
ernment contract administrators endeavor to authorize the cor-
rect amount of time which is necessary to accomplish the work.
(6) There are too many variables and unknowns in
the repair industry to definitize an incentive
contract
.
The above lends itself to supporting, instead of refuting
incentive contracts. Because of the number of variables and
unknowns, incentives can be used to allow the contractor to
make trade-off decisions.
(7) Since milestones are logical candidates to be
incentivized, it will be difficult to state
how the incentive system will work after the
first milestone is not met.
The above is true if milestones are incentivized. If the
contractor can miss some of the initial milestones, but still
get the ship out of the yard on time, or ahead of schedule,
the contractor still deserves an incentive.
(8) There is a manpower limitation. Some SUP-
SHIP repair activities are not now presently
manned to handle any incentive type contract.
Manpower limitations can be resolved by adding extra per-
sonnel to the rosters of needy SUPSHIP activities. This anti-
incentive reason can be overcome (although with possible diffi-




(9) Auditing costs for incentive contracts are
too high.
The writer is of the opinion the above is correct when
considering contracts for research and development, but the
auditing costs may not be excessive when considering ship re-
pair (i.e., the work done is usually known). Presently, each
SUPSHIP activity does have a number of auditors assigned to each
contractor to administer and audit the individual contracts.
(10) Small repair activities are not organized to
work with an incentive contract. It is diffi-
cult to talk contract theory to a small busi-
ness when their main concern is cash flow to
keep the business as an ongoing concern. Small
contractors will require more sophisticated
contracting, cost records, pricing and estimat-
ing systems.
The above is a good reason for not incentivizing
.
(11) Incentives will not always work because the
contractor may sometimes find himself in a
situation where the added cost of overtime
far outweighs any possible incentive.
The above will be true at times, although overtime for
growth work is presently added to the cost of the contract.
(12) It is sometimes questionable whether adequate
time is offered to the contractor to complete
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on time, due to delays in approving changes
or disruption in other forms. This disrup-
tion is used by the contractor in support of
his claims and would be used as a factor, by
the contractor, if the incentive was withheld.
The writer feels the above is the heart of the MSR problem.
When changes are issued, the contract changes and so do the
milestones. What the Navy wants to be able to do is to issue
changes and have the contractor meet the original schedules,
regardless of the number of changes. Possibly this disruption
can be overcome if large enough incentives are offered to the
contractor and all milestones are not incentivized.
2 . Fixed Price Award Fee Contracts
Question. Realizing that growth work exists, and that
it may increase the original effort by as much as 50 to 60 per
cent during an overhaul, do you feel a Fixed Price Award Fee
(FPAF) contract will resolve the problem (i.e., the delivery
schedule)? Bear in mind that the award fee would be based
strictly upon the ability of the contractor to meet or beat
the scheduled delivery date of the ship as well as the con-
tractor's performance.
To this question, the U.S. Navy personnel (that believe
in incentives) were 2 2% in favor of a FPAF, 33% against, and the
remaining 45% were classified as undecided, (but acknowledged
that it possibly may work).
a. Specific comments addressed to this new type of
contract are as follows:
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(1) A FPAF contract would be hard to administer.
(2) This type of contract would have the advan-
tage of working at two levels -
(a) for total management of the activity.
(b) for total management of the changes.
(3) The U.S. Navy contracting officials can then
take growth work into consideration when the
contract is awarded, and not after the award.
Contractor's responded to the question with 50% definitely
stating it will not work and the other 50°s leaning toward the
idea but were not sure of its consequences.
Responses by Navy personnel who were in favor of a FPAF
contract are self-explanatory. Although difficulty of admin-
istration does seem to be a problem because a FPAF is a new
type of contract, the award fee would be the only item to be
administered which was not previously administered under the
FFP contract. The award fee can be made to be dependent upon
performance or schedule or both. Since most contractors try
to do the best job possible with respect to performance, meet-
ing "scheduled dates" can be the sole measuring devices for •
the amount of award fee to be given to the contractor. In
this instance then, contract administration would not be that
difficult or taxing.
3 . Fixed Price Incentive Contracts
Question. Despite the growth work, do you believe a
FPI contract which incentivizes schedule and performance will
motivate contractors to deliver ships on schedule?
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Of the U.S. Navy people affirmatively responding to
incentives, 11% accepted the idea of a FPI contract, 33% re-
jected it, and 56% were undecided. The contractors felt more
strongly about the subject and 100% of the contractors who
liked incentives, felt an FPI contract would not be successful.
a. Specific comments addressed to this type of contract
are as follows
:
(1) A FPI contract does not assume numerous changes.
Once the growth work reaches the 5% level, the
incentives would be lost.
The above response is correct in theory but can be remedied
if milestones are renegotiated after changes are submitted.
(2) A FPI contract does not allow the contractor
any trade-offs.
The contention that a FPI contract can limit trade-offs
is acknowledged.
Despite the fact that a FPI contract is presently being
used in the overhaul of the 1052-Class Frigates, some negative
arguments were raised. This is probably due to the fact that
the FPI contract is relatively new to the overhaul process and
has not received wide acceptance or exposure.
4 . Add-On Contracts
During early deliberations with Navy personnel, a
new idea was brought into the discussion which was discussed
with all respondents. It led to the next question.
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Question. Do you feel that if a contractor was awarded
a contract for an overhaul of a ship and was guaranteed to repair
another ship if the contractor finished the first ship by a cer-
tain date, the contractor would be motivated to get both ships
out on time, despite growth work?
Navy personnel answered this question with a response
of 11% for, 331 against, and 56% undecided. Once again, the
contractors' response was 50% for, and 50% against the idea.
a. Specific comments addressed to this concept are
as follows
(1) An "add-on" contract may eventually cause
TYCOM funding problems, since the funds will
not be set aside for the added overhaul that
may not occur on schedule (if the contractor
does not get the first ship out on time)
.
(2) A similar idea has been tried with the learn-
ing curve as the main reason for its useful-
ness. If a contractor keeps the same work
force and is continually awarded job orders
for the same types of ships
,
it is anticipated
that the workers will experience a "learning
process" whereby repeated work on "like"
equipment results in improved work in a shorter
time period. Experience proved that the ships
still did not meet scheduled milestones in
each overhaul. Further research shows that
Planning and Engineering for Repair and Alter-
ations, Combat Support Ships PERA(CSS)
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conducted a study for NAVSEA to determine if
multiple ship overhaul contracts (add-on con-
tracts) are beneficial to the Navy. The U.S.
Navy Minesweeper (MSO) was the ship type
studied. The results of the analysis indicated
that consecutive overhauls may be beneficial
to the Navy. Further research of this idea
with various NAVSEA personnel, confirmed the
fact that consecutive overhauls may work with
small ships of limited complexity, but may
not work with larger ships containing more
sophisticated equipment. This idea (multiple
ship/add-on contracting) is again being ob-
served by higher authorities as to its use-
fulness. Additional study will be conducted
in this area to see if contractors will ex-
perience a learning curve and subsequent
decreasing costs,
b. Other ideas which were discussed in the interviews
with U.S. Navy personnel but were not covered under the pre-
vious topics are as follows
:
(1) The MSR should be modified to allow the Pro-
curing Contracting Officer (PCO) to deter-
mine the type of job Order (i.e., FFP, FPI
,
etc.) under the MSR.
(2) A CPIF contract should be used with heavy
emphasis being placed upon delivery
47

(schedule) as well as cost and performance
(multi- incentive)
.
(3) The contractor should develop his own speci-
fication package to eliminate delays caused
by faulty specifications.
All three arguments are items with merit and can be used
(both totally or in part) as possible solutions to the present
overhaul problems with schedule or work delays. It should be
noted that CPIF contracts are being used. The results are
quality repairs, cost underruns but the majority of the ships
do not complete the overhaul on or ahead of schedule.
5 . Contractor Responses
Additional questions were posed to the contractors to
see what factors motivate their respective companies and what
alternatives the Government has in dealing with them.
Question. What are the primary motives of the ship
repair industry?
The contractor representatives interviewed agreed their
primary motives are the standard motives of industry: 1) socio
economic considerations, 2) firm perpetuation, 3) profit maxi-
mization, and 4) sales maximization. It should be noted that
these motives are not ranked in importance.
Question. What are the most influential factors of




The response to this question was the ability of the
contractor to increase profit and the ability to make trade-
offs between performance and schedule.
This response is supportive of incentive contracts,
but the contractors failed to cite another reason which would
occur as a result of incentives; namely, an increased return on
investment for the contractor. The possibility of an increased
return can be very appealing to industry, especially when ex-
plaining to stockholders how "their" money is being used and
how much return the stockholder's money is receiving.
Question. What would you recommend as an alternative
or addition to, the present firm fixed-price contract the U.S.
Navy presently uses for their ship repair, that would sufficiently
motivate you to complete an overhaul on or ahead of schedule,
despite the fact that "growth work" has caused delays?
Only one of the contractors stated that a cost type
contract would resolve the present dilemma in ship repair. A
CPIF contract was tendered by the contractor as the only means
of helping the contractor to meet the schedule and stop ruth-
less bidding. As stated in previous paragraphs, CPIF contracts
are not necessarily motivating the contractor to get the ships
out of the yard any sooner. The contractors did have some views
and ideas regarding the present system which were felt important
to examine, regardless if the MSR is incentivized or not. These
comments are summarized below:
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a. There should be greater emphasis (by the U.S. Navy)
to even out the ship repair work load. All contractors inter-
viewed felt that if there was a constant input of repair work,
the contractors would be able to keep a steady work force
(thereby retaining key employees) , would be able to improve
the skills of their other workers, would eliminate ruthless
bidding, would provide better competition, and would result in
ships not being delayed and create a better atmosphere between
the Government and the contractor.
Under the miscellaneous comments regarding the MSR, the
above item is a very important point to raise, however, this is
just a regional problem. After interviewing people from various
parts of the country, it was concluded that this fact does not
exist on the East Coast and Gulf Coast.
b. Retention fees should be re-evaluated. Since the
company has already been determined as responsive, it seems
unnecessary to hold back large sums of money when only minor
discrepancies exist. In large contracts, retention fees force
the contractor to borrow money which adds greatly to his contract
costs. Retention fees should be reduced, eliminated, or revert
to a diminishing scale, dependent on the size of the contract.
The Government should also be forced to disclose the amount of
monev it is retaining at the end of the overhaul.&
Clause 8 (see appendix) of the MSR contract entitles con-
tractors to periodic payments based on the percentage of com-
pletion of the overhaul or the repair work. The purpose
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of the progress payments is to provide working capital for the
contractor. This clause also requires the Contracting Officer
to withhold 10 per cent of the value of the progress payments.
This amount is paid upon successful completion of the contract.
This deduction is known as a retention fee. Retention fees
discussed above may be a major problem while under the guarantee
period, but these fees are a means of control by the contract
administrator. This action may cause the contractor to borrow
money, but the contractor is aware of this before the contract
is awarded. Besides, the contractor can set up preliminary
funds before the overhaul to "cover" these retained funds and
does receive progress payments which is to his advantage.
c. The Government should extend a contract rather than
force the contractor to pay overtime rates.
This response is most curious, especially since all the con-
tractors admit that the longer a ship is kept in their yard
for repair, the more contractor "out of pocket" costs are
incurred.
d. Material constraints are often the causes of de-
lays in ship repair. Longer lead-time items should be ordered
earlier than the present directives dictate.
This comment has merit and should be considered by the
Government in future dealings with contractors.
e. The contract training for Government and contractor
representatives should be at the same place in order to in-
crease a better understanding of the ship repair system.
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The above has merit and should be considered by the Govern-
ment in future dealings with contractors
.
f. The completion date for a ship should be bilaterally
made by the Government and the contractor at a joint meeting.
When dates are agreed upon, the Program Evaluation and Review
Technique (PERT) or the Critical Path Method (CPM) methods
should be used to monitor the overhaul by both the Government
and the contractor.
The ideas presented under the above seem to be contradic-
tory to fact since completion times are negotiated. This is
evidently an outgrowth of the changes clause which most con-
tractors are against.
g. The majority of the ships crews should be taken off
the ship in the yards. A skeletal crew can remain as agents of
the Government. With the entire crew present, much disruption
occurs, and it finally leads to a crew with poor morale and to
decreased output from the contractors.
This suggestion has merit and should be considered by the
Government in future dealings with contractors.l o •
h. The Navy inspector's stop repair work when they do
not have the power to do so. They have the power to advise,
but not halt work.
The above discloses a major problem area; namely, unauth-
orized work stoppages. There is no excuse for unauthorized
stoppages, but contractor quality assurance (OA) systems might
stop work anyhow without intervention by Government inspectors.
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i. The changes clause is too unilateral. Contractors
should have an input and state when job orders cannot be done in
the allowed time frames.
Even though the changes clause is a unilateral undertaking,
the contractor can request an extension, authorize overtime,
or cancel. This statement appears to be "uncalled for" since
the contractor does have an alternative.
j. Maximum price job orders should only be issued to
low priority work which can be eventually canceled if necessary.
Sometimes when maximum price job orders are input into the sys-
tem, the Government and contractor estimates do not agree. It
is later changed to a modification and eventually negotiated.
This present system wastes both the Government's and the con-
tractor's time.
The above is strictly a statement of the contractor's wish
to "get-well" on change orders. Pre-priced change orders are
not appealing to the contractor since it is easier to cover
costs and mistakes by an after-the-fact priced change order
where actual costs incurred are discussed, vice estimated
costs. The contractor loses any leeway when dealing with
pre-priced change orders. This procedure is advantageous to
the Government and should not be changed.
k. The guarantee clause of the MSR is costly to the
contractor. Ships are in the yards as long as a year. Some
of the equipment has been repaired early in the overhaul,
but the contractor must continually go back to the equipment
3J

to ensure it works well and must continue repair work 60 days
after the completion date. Since both the crew and the con-
tractor operate the equipment, the 60 day guarantee period
should begin when the equipment is deemed completed or when
the crew makes it operational. Overhauls now cover a long
period of time and so maintenance of gear this length of time
is very costly.
Guarantee period is a topic which has some merit at first
glance, but is not so simple upon further observation. Since
the Government pays reasonable prices for a good product, there
should be no reason xvhy the Government should expect this pro-
duct to last only the first few months of the overhaul. If
the views presented by this argument are implemented, theoret-
ically, the Government could accept a ship (upon completion of
repairs) whose equipment is not functioning properly when
deployed. The Navy presently experiences problems with equip-
ment upon completion of the overhaul. If the guarantee clause
were changed, the results could be devastating with respect
to a quality product that operates correctly upon completion
of the overhaul.
1. The clause on inclement weather places the con-
tractor at a disadvantage, especially if delays in shipment
for Government furnished material necessitates work to begin
durins bad weather. Due to advanced weather forecasting this
clause should be subject to removal on a year to year basis,
dependent upon the expected weather.
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Loss of schedule due to bad weather is a weak reason for
eliminating the inclement weather clause since the contractor
does get a day for day extension of the schedule as a result
of inclement weather. Weather is beyond the control of the
Government
.
m. A conference should be held between ship personnel
and the contractor during the period beginning after the award
of the contract, and commencing before the ship arrives, to go
over pertinent data
A Post-Award Conference has merit and should be considered
by the Government in future dealings with contractors
.
n. A conference should be held upon completion of the
overhaul in which the Government and the contractor evaluate
the overhaul so that there can be lessons learned and complete
honesty about past mistakes
A Post-Overhaul Conference has merit and should be con-
sidered by the Government in future dealings with contractors.
o. Contractors should be paid for estimates. It is
a very costly proposition, especially under the present sys-
tem where the contractor must prove his estimate and the
Government does not.
Contractors do get reimbursed for estimates if awarded
the contract. Contractors are not required to bid, and
should not bid if they are unwilling to take the risk of not
winning, and hence not being reimbursed for estimates.

p. There should be an automatic formula of granting
extra days delay in the yards proportional to the size of the
contract.
The driving force behind this contractor statement is that
contractors are cramped for time during each overhaul. With
an inordinate amount of changes and modifications, this may be
true, but SUPSHIPs does grant "extra days delay" when consider-
ing changes
.
q. The Government Project Manager for a ship should
have greater contracting authority. The authority should be
increased both in scope and in dollar threshold.
This suggestion has merit and should be considered by the
Government in future dealings with contractors.
r. The time it takes to process a modification should
be lessened. Too many contractor hours are wasted waiting
for approval to continue work.
The above has merit and should be considered by the Govern-
ment in future dealings with contractors.
6. NAVSEA Procedures
Further investigation of the MSR problem (i.e., deliv-
ery schedule) was conducted with various individuals from NAV-
SEA. NAVSEA is presently using a FPI contract for the over-
hauls of the 1052 Class Frigate. The incentives are associated
with the overhaul milestones. The reason for basing the in-
centives exclusively on schedule was to stress the importance
of meeting scheduled delivery dates (including certain
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milestones) to the contractor. It should be noted that NAV-
SEA also realizes that the milestones must be realistic, and
that the change orders (including both numbers of change orders
and type of change orders) must be controlled. The "milestone








f. Redelivery of Vessel
The dates will be "equitably adjusted" should delays occur
which are beyond the control and without fault and negligence
of the contractor. The overall thrust of the incentive is to
provide a monetary reward if the contractor intensifies his
management efforts in controlling and managing his work force
and production scheduling.
NAVSEA is also looking at other problems regarding
overhauls. There is a steering committee for "improvement
of overhauls in the private sector" which has presented a
plan of action as well as milestones at which the recommenda-
tions should be implemented or completed. The program ele-
ments of the steering committee covered topics as: contract-
ing methods, overhaul planning, quality of work, organization
and staffing, and problem identification. Due to the length
of this plan and the fact that many of the subjects of the
plan do not have a direct bearing on this thesis, the plan
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will not be discussed. However, in Chapter 6, references
will be made to this plan and how this plan differs from the
proposals of this thesis.
D . SUMMARY
From the data presented in this chapter, it is apparent
that the solution to the ship repair schedule problem is not
clear-cut nor obvious. Even though many experienced people
were contacted, no particular, all-encompassing solution did
surface. In fact, the only unified response was that a change
is needed, but what this change was and a means of accomplish-
ing this change was not provided. NAVSEA is presently working
on a plan which may alleviate some of the overhaul problems
.
The following section will present an alternative plan which




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Even though NAVSEA is using a FPI contract in the overhaul/
repair of ships, the success of this recent attempt still re-
mains to be verified. As stated in the previous chapter, no
concensus (from the people in the field - SUPSHIP activities)
was reached regarding a successful course of action (i.e., FPI,
CPAF, etc.). A majority of the personnel felt that properly
incentivized contracts would improve the delivery of ships as
originally scheduled. The present work of NAVSEA on FPI con-
tracts coupled with the field activity representative responses
indicate that incentives will work and lend support to the
initial hypothesis and point to the fact that a monetary incen-
tive may be the only reasonable motivation left for the Govern-
ment to instill some urgency into the management of a contractor
It is therefore concluded that a FPI contract or a Fixed Price
Award Fee contract can be used by the Government to motivate
the contractor to meet scheduled delivery dates of ships in
overhaul. The CPAF contract was not judged to be a viable
alternative due to the extra personnel needed to monitor costs
as well as those required to monitor and determine the award
amount. This type of contract would pose too much of a strain
on the system's resources in terms of administrative costs and
the increased numbers of personnel which would have to be im-
mediately input into the system.
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This conclusion is supported in part by the interviews
done with contractors and ship repair personnel and the fact
that NAVSEA is presently using an incentive contract with a
certain class of ship. It is important to point out that
even though an incentive contract is being used, recommenda-
tions for additional actions and the plan for the FPAF con-
tract will be proposed, should present methods (FPI contract)
prove ineffective.
B. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The thrust of the research indicates the participants spoke
as individuals concerned with the problem and seeking its solu-
tion, and not as the "sounding boards" of the various commands
associated with ship repair work. The opinions expressed by
the personnel interviewed were stated in honesty and without
fear of being quoted which is a strong indication that the par-
ticipants were not apprehensive nor fearful of their own con-
victions .
A major limitation of this study is that the contractors
were from one region and may not express the majority opinion
of the ship repair facilities around the United States. How-
ever, items which appear to be strictly regional problems were
labeled as such (in this text) and dealt with in that manner
(as a strictly regional problem)
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are provided as a possible





THAT THE MASTER SHIP REPAIR CONTRACT AND THE SHIP
REPAIR CONTRACTING MANUAL (REPAIR MANUAL ) BE
REVISED TO ELIMINATE THE PREFERENCE FOR FORMALLY
ADVERTISED FIXED-PRICE JOB ORDERS.
Policies should emphasize the importance of choosing from
other contract types which are in the existing spectrum of con-
tracts (i.e., FPI or FPAF) , that type or combination of types
best suited to the particularity of the procurement. The Con-
tracting Officer would thus be given more latitude in construct-
ing contracts. Since the PCO finds himself within a narrow
framework when coping with the repair scenario; the way it has
always been done is frequently more attractive than innovative
procedures to "better" do the job. Thoughts of finding the
"one best way" should be discarded and consideration of optimiz-
ing each individual procurement should be paramount. Even
though a FFP contract has the advantages of: 1) the contractor
assuming the risk, 2) profit provisions motivating the contrac-
tor to control costs and achieving prescribed performance levels,
and 3) the profit motive substituting for Government administra-
tion and surveillance, the continued uses of this type of con-
tract (FFP) in ship repair is no longer appropriate. The
reason for this fact is that a FFP contract requires definite
specifications (so the degree of risk can be assessed) and
allows only a limited number of change orders. The lack of
adequate specifications and a large number of change orders





COMBINATION OF CURRENT METHODS AND NEW INNOVATIVE
METHODS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AS LONG AS THE METHODS
ARE BASED ON SOUND JUDGEMENT
One single method used in exclusion (i.e., firm fixed-price
job orders) can seldom do a complete task of incentivizing the
contractor, except in the simplest overhauls. By allowing
some leeway for the contracting officer, contract type can be
a matter of negotiation.
Recommendation 5 :
TO INCREASE MANNING LEVELS AT SUPSHIP ACTIVITIES
TO MEET THE ADDED WORKLOAD CAUSED BY INCENTIVE
CONTRACTS.
This should be done on a temporary basis until the contract
administration personnel are at ease in the incentive arena.
Many years of dealing strictly with FFP contracts tends to
dampen their potential. This recommendation is posed merely
as a "stop gap" procedure until expertise is brought up to a
necessary level.
Recommendation 4 :
A STUDY GROUP SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO ASCERTAIN
WHETHER ALL PAPERWORK GENERATED AND REQUIRED
BY SUPSHIP ACTIVITIES ARE ACTUALLY NECESSARY.
THIS STUDY SHOULD ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY WHICH
PAPERWORK CAN BE AUTOMATED.
After completing the interviews with both the contractors
and contract administrators, it became readily apparent that
there is a strong possibility that the bureaucratic paper flow-
may be the cause of much delay in the overhaul process, and
that this delav is often unnecessary. If certain requirements
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are computerized, needed reports can be routinely generated
by the computer.
Recommendation 5 :
THE PRE-OVERHAUL TEST AND INSPECTION (POTS I)
PERIOD SHOULD BE SCHEDULED CLOSER TO THE
OVERHAUL COMMENCEMENT.
The POT^I is probably the most important factor in the
development of a clear and explicit work package. The purpose
of the POT§I is to verify equipment problem areas through
special test procedures. With a POT§I date scheduled closer
to the beginning of the overhaul, there won ' t be a large amount
of additional requirements generated between the testing period
and work commencement (which causes schedule slippages) . If
the work package is more well-defined and current, growth work
will not hamper overhaul operations as it presently does.
NAVSEA is recommending a plan for a dedicated P0T§I period to
the CNO which will help alleviate the problem. NAVSEA also has
a contingent plan to possibly insert a "mini" P0T§I before the
overhaul to cover the period between the scheduled testing
period and the overhaul. If, in fact, this smaller inspection
is used, work packages problems may be significantly eliminated
Recommendation 6 :
CONTINUE TO USE INVITATION FOR BIDS (IFB) VICE
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS (RFP)
.
The MSR presently requires an IFB (except where the scope
of the work cannot be defined) to increase competition. NAV-
SEA is recommending that RFP's be used in future dealings with
the proposed FPI contract. Until there is a better understand-
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ing of the new process, IFB's should be used since an RFP can
eliminate the small contractor who is able to accomplish the
work but is not sophisticated enough to provide an adequate
RFP. By using an RFP, the base of support can be gradually
eroded until the small contractor will not be able to present
a proposal that will appear as all-encompassing as one from a
large contractor. The result is that the smaller business will
eventually be eliminated from negotiations.
Recommendation 7 :
STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS SHOULD BE WRITTEN FOR
ROUTINE FUNCTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE "GREY AREA"
DRAFTED INTO MANY SPECIFICATIONS BY THE ORIG-
INATORS.
NAVSEA is now trying "to increase SUPSHIP productivity and
reduce contractor effort in preparing bids through the use of
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standard specifications."
"A Standard Specification for Ship Repair and
Alteration Committee (SSRAC) was established
to develop, revise and control the standard
specifications. Individual SUPSHIPs generally
along central overhaul planning assignment




If standard specifications are created, much lost time and
delay due to faulty information will be eliminated. The result
will be a smoother overhaul period. Should the various SUP-
SHIP activities run into problems fulfilling this task, private




THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD OPEN GOVERNMENT TRAIN-
ING FACILITIES TO CONTRACTOR "ACQUISITION"
PERSONNEL TO INCREASE THE AWARENESS OF GOVERN-
MENT AND CONTRACTOR PROBLEMS AND TO FACILITATE
COMMUNICATIONS.
By having both the contractor (who would reimburse the
Government for the training services provided) and the Gov-
ernment acquisition personnel train at the same facilities,
a dialogue can be created to alleviate procedural problems
that arise. Arguments opposing this idea believe that the
purpose of legal counsel is to solve problems originating
because of differing interpretations of a contract. It is
of the opinion of this writer that it is to the benefit of
the Government to avoid litigation whenever possible. NAVSEA
is recommending that selected trades of the repair industry
be improved through the Job Corps under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training (CETA) program. This idea, coupled
with the above recommendation, should improve both the con-
tractor's work ability and contract administration.
Recommendation 9 :
ONLY A SKILLED SKELETAL CREW SHOULD REMAIN
ONBOARD A SHIP IN OVERHAUL.
These crew members should be carefully screened so that
this skeletal crew is well versed in equipment and shipboard
requirements. With only a chosen few remaining, the contrac-
tor will not be able to cite disruption by the crew as a
reason for delay of schedule. The members departing the
ship can either be sent to training facilities to increase
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their abilities or be transferred to other ships coming out
of the yards. By using only a limited number of men, manpower
will not be wasted waiting for equipment to be repaired by the
contractor, nor will men stand idle while their work space is
being worked upon by the contractor. The effect is a better
utilization of manpower. A recent article in the Wall Street
Journal concerning the overhaul of the U.S.S. Saratoga alluded
to the fact that small nucleus crews have great advantages.
The advantages were not specified but it can reasonably be
assumed that smaller crews mean a maximization of the crews
ability, decreased costs for crew support, and less disruption
caused betxveen the contractor and the Government.
Recommendation 10 :
THE NAVY SHOULD DETERMINE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DISRUPTION COSTS BY ACCOMPLISHING A DETAILED
STUDY IN THIS AREA.
Disruption means to cause turmoil or disorder. Disruption
costs "is the difference between the actual cost for a program
on the one hand, and the cost 'reasonably required' to perform
the task and construct the hardware in the configuration fin-
ally delivered to the customer, on the other." This idea,
heralded by Mr. E. B. Cochran, has three reasons as the causes
of disruption: force majeure, concurrency of product develop-
ment (or design) and production, and inadequate planning and
management
.
"Force majeure covers such catastrophic out-
side events as a natural disaster, civil dis-
order, major strike, fire, etc. Concurrency
of design and production disrupts an organiza-
tion by introducing the uncertainty inherent
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in the design process . . . Good planning
and management is of great importance to a
new program. The task may be well under-
stood and thoroughly planned at the onset,
adequate resources of men, materials, facili-
ties and money must be available at the ap-
propriate times and the program must be ad-
ministered with suitable precision and detailed
control over operations."^ 5
Even though the concurrency problem is not applicable in the
ship repair scenario, the other basic causes do pertain to this
situation. Factors such as time compression, labor disruption,
conflicts of scheduling, conflicts of crew size (i.e., the
contractor's crew size), delays in design, material, facilities,
changes in design, production procedures, unrealistic estimat-
ing, misrepresentation of tasks by the Government or the con-
tractor, specification changes, failure to issue necessary data,
misleading or erroneous information, interferences with con-
tractor's vendors or employees, poor internal planning, etc.
can be determined for an overhaul and those percentages can
be applied to claims filed by contractors. The ability to
scientifically state how a certain type of disruption affects
contractor performance, and declaring approximately how many
dollars these disruptions equate to are most important in the
claims area. This fact is especially true since contractors
are now using such things as inefficiency studies done by
the Department of Labor in 1947 to support their claims.
Since the Department of Defense (DOD) "... faces a highly
determined, technically competent opponent which focuses vast
and increasing resources consistently on its long-range im-
perialistic objections . ,." , it is imperative that the
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Department of the Navy be able to determine the costs of dis-
ruption so as to prevent needless delays of ships in overhaul.
Recommendation 11 :
TYCOM APPROVAL OF ADDITIONAL WORK AFTER THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE OVERHAUL SHOULD BE
LIMITED ONLY TO REPAIRS WHICH AFFECT THE
MISSION OF THE SHIP.
This recommendation is not attempting to blame any or-
ganization or individual for randomly approving any job order
without forethought, but is trying to disclose the fact that if
only high priority items are approved, much growth work can be
eliminated from each overhaul. Non'-essential items can be
postponed to later availability periods. With decreased job
orders, contract administration functions can be more easily
accomplished.
Recommendation 12 :
STABILIZE THE WORK LOADS IN THE VARIOUS RE-
GIONS OF THE COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN A MOBILIZA-
TION BASE AS WELL AS KEEPING A BASELINE OF
EMPLOYEES AT EACH CONTRACTOR.
Acknowledging the fact that different portions of the country
have different labor rates (hence varying costs of ship repair)
and some portions are therefore more appealing than others to
accomplish an overhaul, it should be pointed out that a mobil-
ization base must be preserved. Current practices seem to
innundate regions with work while depleting others. True,
this may be classified as a regional problem, but while certain
regions are being used, and others not, workers will leave
contractors in the depressed areas. The result is a weakening
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of the contractors of that region and the base of support.
By keeping a steady to moderate influx of work into an area,
a contractor's work force will be stable. This work force
will improve its skills by performing similar work on similar
equipment. In time, the contractor will experience a learn-
ing curve. The result will be decreased costs for the Govern-
ment in the future.
Recommendation 15 :
GOVERNMENT FURNISHED MATERIAL (GFM) SHOULD BE
RE-EVALUATED AND STUDIED TO SEE IF SOME OF
THE MATERIAL CURRENTLY PROVIDED BY THE GOVERN-
MENT COULD BE BETTER FURNISHED BY THE CONTRACTOR.
The intent of this recommendation is not to have the con-
tractor furnish ammunition or major weapons systems but rather
to make the contractor responsible for items (i.e., gages,
certain valves, etc.) which can be more readily obtained by
the contractor at his locale which still satisfy military
specifications and do not take as much time (and possibly at
a decreased cost) to acquire as might occur if the Government
procures such material. This is not passing judgement on the
Government acquisition process. It is just stating the fact
that certain materials may be obtained at a decreased cost,
locally, by the contractor. The result would be shorter lead
times than can be expected if the Government formally adver-
tises a procurement.
Recommendation 14 ;
ENCOURAGE A "LESSONS LEARNED" CONFERENCE




This conference is recommended solely as a means of im-
proving Government/contractor communications. If a meeting
were held where differences can be aired without fear of
litigation, problem areas can be resolved. With continual
feedback after each overhaul, a dialogue will be created
which can stifle petty issues and allow the flow of informa-
tion to continue, as well as permit overhauls to proceed with
speed and surety.
Recommendation 15 :
A STUDY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF
THE DOLLAR LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY FOR
SUPERVISORY INSPECTORS OR SURVEYORS SHOULD
BE INCREASED.
This study should be addressed with the understanding that
all individuals in charge of work at contractors' plants are
not capable of executing supplemental agreements of increased
dollar value. The recommendation is made merely to alleviate
congestion areas in the overhaul process. The purpose is not
to usurp the ACO's authority but to provide an avenue of ac-
celeration whereby capable inspectors or surveyors can keep
the overhaul on track, without having to revert back to SUP-
SHIP or NAVSEA for approval.
Recommendation 16 :
THAT THE FIXED PRICE AWARD FEE CONTRACT BE
CONSIDERED AS A "CURRENT METHOD" OR, AT




This contract type can be used as a viable alternative to
the FFP contract or the FPI contract currently being used as a
test case. An award type of contract allows flexibility to
the contract administrators.
"The flexibility in the award fee provision ...
stems essentially from three factors: (1) the
subjective nature of the performance evaluation
process, (2) the buyer's right to change or modify
areas to be considered for performance evaluation
and (3) the versatility with which the amount of
the award fee can be distributed over the life of
the contract. "37
The award fee will ensure that "communications between the
buyer and supplier ... be equal or better than that under other
38types of contracts."
The award fee provision will be the major element to motivate
the contractor to provide superior contract performance. The
actual award pool should range from two to ten per cent (these
figures can be changed) of the fixed-price portion of the con-
tract. The percentages will vary according to how difficult
the overhaul will be and how urgent it may be to get the ship
out early from the yard period.
In evaluating the contractor's performance on individual
ship overhauls, the following major areas should be considered
(the weights of each area should be dependent upon the "needs
of the Navy" at that point in time)
;
1) Responsiveness (schedule)
a) Delivery of product- dependent upon the ability
of the contractor to meet all milestones. This takes into
consideration the contractor's adherence to the overall plan,
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notification of the Government in case of changes and the
number of changes generated by the Government or the contractor,
b) Submission of data and reports
(1) adherence to schedule
(2) the quality of the reports themselves
2) Quality of the final product
a) Conformance to specifications
b) Quality Assurance (QA) system (plans and staffing)
c) Contractor responsiveness to correct QA infrac-
tions. This is tied-in directly to the repair "reject" rate,
the number of waivers (if needed) , or trouble and failure
reports, etc.
The weights of each major area (i.e., responsiveness and
quality) can vary between 20-60 per cent, dependent upon the
relative importance of mission success. These major areas
can also be changed and the Government can emphasize new items.
For example, present trends show that value engineering change
proposals are not being submitted. True, there is only a lim-
ited area in ship repair where changes of this nature can be
applicable, but should value engineering be incentivi zed
,
possible decreased life-cycle costs may be obtained in the
future
.
The contractor's performance should be evaluated quarterly.
The performance evaluation/award fee determining board can be
composed of the ship's Project Manager (ship supervisor), sur-
veyors, and contracting personnel. Of course, recommendations
for award fee must be reviewed by higher authorities (ACO,
PCO, NAVSEA) and will not be subject to the Disputes Clause.
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The use of a FPAF contract is provided merely as an alter-
native. Due to the newness of the FPAF contract and the fact
that people are not familiar with it, a pilot study can be
done (should the FPI contract fail) to see if this type of
contract is a feasible means of contracting for ship repairs.
The beauty of the FPAF is that the work to be accomplished
is treated as a regular FFP contract, the award being the
mechanism by which the Government can motivate increased com-
munications and performance for a moderate cost.
"The use of an award fee motivates people.
Interaction between Government and con-
tracor personnel occurs at all levels
between management and workers. The inter-
action of the fee determining official
and contractor management flows down to
workers as a result of the communication
process which must be established if the
contractor is to earn the award fee. "39
Questions are raised that the administrative costs may be
prohibitive. Before the ACO personnel are trained, this may
appear to have substance, though once the system is under-
stood by both the Government and the contractor, routines
will be developed which will not equate to present "disrup-
tion costs."
Other factors discussed state that "the award fee pro-
vision may be counter-productive if the fee award is not
40
promptly made at the end of the evaluation period." This
item will be a problem area if ACO personnel fail to follow
the contract format. Constant and special attention to this
area will alleviate the problem.
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"Timely evaluations and communications
covering performance progress are essential
to obtaining the motivation desired ...
Therefore, if the evaluation periods for
award fee determinations and payment ex-
tend over several or many months , interim
evaluations may be provided and discussed
with the contractor. Studies have shown
that the frequency of the evaluations
and communication of interim ratings are
more important as a motivator to the con-
tractor than the formal fee award. "41
The Government thus will have a flexible, management tool
to accomplish an overhaul.
"Through the use of regular evaluations
that are documented and provided to an
influential executive within the contract-
ing organization, an explicit control feed
back loop is established at a high manage-
ment level. This high level feed back from
the buyer to the seller generates additional
vertical communications within the organiza-
tion and results in management actions to
reconcile problems or reward high perform-
ance. The formal feedback mechanism, by
its presence, tends to break down barriers
to communication and cooperation at all
levels, leading to performance improve-
ments within contractor and Government
organizations . "4 2
D. SUMMARY
This study has suggested that incentives can be used ef-
fectively in the repair scenario. Informal interviews and
present NAVSEA actions indicate that the MSR can be effec-
tively incentivized. The recommendations in this chapter
were tendered to provide a means of improving existing
conditions. Each recommendation should be considered when
devising a uniform package to incentivize the MSR. It is not
just a one-step process. Many areas and topics must be
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addressed before a solution is obtained. The combination
of current methods and new innovative methods should be en-
couraged to be implemented to resolve on-going issues. One
single method used in exclusion of all others can seldom do
a complete job of incentivizing the contractor, except on the
simplest programs. This whole process will take much time,
but a long journey is started by the first step. This study
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